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This paper investigates the economic structure of professional sports to
determine the extent to which the current operating rules justify exemp-
tion of professional sports leagues from some aspects of antitrust
statutes. We construct a formal decision-making model incorporating
certain fundamental features of the industry. Within the context of the
model we find that, under current rules of operation, equalization of
playing strengths is generally not consistent with profit maximization
by teams. However, we suggest a rule that guarantees convergence to
a path of equal playing strengths under decentralized control of teams.
As an example we study baseball leagues. Some refinements of the
model are introduced, for example, incorporating time lags and training
costs that result when teams train their own players.
Over the past twenty years, the U.S. Congress has held a number of hear-
ings on various bills designed to exempt certain practices of the profes-
sional sports industry from prosecution under the federal antitrust statutes.
While two bills providing such exemption for special aspects of sports have
passed the Congress, one dealing with the AFL-NFL merger in professional
football and the second dealing with television and radio contract pooling,
the issue of exemption for other phases of professional sports still has not
been resolved. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate the economic
structure of professional sports to determine the extent to which the
current operating rules of professional sports justify such an exemption.
Thus this paper considers some of the problems investigated by Rotten-
berg (1956) in his excellent study of the labor market in baseball, but
from a somewhat different point of view and with emphasis on somewhat
different aspects of professional sports. The approach adopted here is to
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construct a formal decision-making model of a professional sports league,
incorporating certain of the more fundamental features peculiar to this
industry. Within the context of this model, the issue of "equalization of
competitive playing strengths," the basic justification for antitrust ex-
emption, is investigated. It is shown that, under current rules of operation,
such equalization is generally not consistent with profit maximization
by teams in a professional sports league. A simple rule is suggested, how-
ever, which does guarantee convergence to a position of equalization of
playing strengths within the context of decentralized control of teams.
2
Congressional activities relative to professional sports are the result of a
series of confusing and, to the layman, contradictory decisions by the
U.S. Supreme Court concerning the antitrust status of the various
professional sports. Briefly, in 1922 in Baltimore Federal Baseball Club v.
National League, a unanimous court held that organized baseball was
exempt from operation of the federal antitrust statutes because the business
of baseball did not involve an article of commerce in the sense of the
commerce clause of the Constitution. This exemption was upheld by a
divided court in the 1953 case of Toolson v. New York Yankees. Without
examining the facts in this case, the majority argued that stare decisis
should apply, particularly in view of the large investments in baseball
properties that had been made following the earlier decision. However, in
Radovitch v. National Football League, in 1957, the court held that,
despite the obvious similarities between the economic structure and rules
of professional football and baseball, football was not exempt from applica-
tion of the antitrust statutes. In the course of that decision, the court
stated that, if baseball were to come before the court for the first time
again, it would clearly be ruled subject to the antitrust statutes as well.
Recognizing the anomaly of this situation, the court requested the Con-
gress to write appropriate legislation to resolve the conflicting treatments
afforded basball and the other professional sports. Consequently, the Con-
gress has been attempting, since the early 1950s, to develop and pass a
comprehensive bill covering the four major professional team sports of
baseball, football, basketball, and hockey. It might be noted parenthetically
that it is only because of an almost unbelievable lack of public tact on
the part of the owners and controllers of professional baseball that such
a bill has not yet been passed. Thus such events as the moves of the New
York and Brooklyn franchises to San Francisco and Los Angeles caused
tabling of a bill in 1958; later a bill which had passed the House and
was sponsored by forty-nine senators was set aside in the wake of rumors
concerning a move of the Washington franchise, and similar results
followed from the moves of the Milwaukee and Kansas City franchises
and the sale of the New York Yankees to the CBS television network.
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More recently, the transfer of the Seattle franchise has again raised the
issue of removing baseball's antitrust exemption.
The need for legislation arises from the practices employed by profes-
sional sports, many of which would constitute illegal restraints of trade
in almost any other industry. These practices are not generally enforceable
in the courts but instead are maintained through blacklists and/or other
sanctions within the industry. Aside from specific details which differ
among the four major professional team sports, these practices relate to
(1) rules governing the ownership and acquisition of player contracts,
(2) rules governing territorial rights, and (3) rules governing television
and radio contracts.
In each of the major professional sports leagues, playing contracts
contain a "reserve clause" which effectively binds the player to the team
owning the contract for the length of the player's career or until the
contract is sold (the "option" clause of football contracts adds some
slight flexibility to this). In addition, each of the sports has rules govern-
ing the acquisition of new playing talent that typically permit the drafting
of new talent in reverse order of finish by teams in the previous year's
league standings; the bonus paid to such players is the result of negotia-
tions between the drafting team and the player. There are also rules
designed to limit the ability of any team to hold players in minor leagues,
and limits on the number of players that any one team may control.
Territorial rights are granted by the league to the teams in the league
and typically give exclusive rights to organize a team within a designated
geographic area, varying from a 35- to a 75-mile radius about the playing
field of the team. Fiinally, a bill passed in 1961 grants exemption from
antitrust prosecution for contracts signed between professional sports
leagues and television or radio networks to control broadcasts or telecasts
of league games, with joint participation of league members in the proceeds
of such contracts.
Professional sports have requested antitrust exemption for the above
practices on the grounds that such practices are necessary to bring about
"equalization of playing strengths among teams" and to maintain public
confidence in the honesty of the contests. Thus it is argued that, if the
reserve clause were eliminated, players would sign contracts with the
wealthiest team in the league, thus destroying competition and eventually
the sport itself. Further, with players jumping from team to team, the
public would begin to suspect players of throwing contests. These argu-
ments about the reserve clause have been dealt with by Rottenberg, who
points out that the possibility of buying and selling contracts among
teams raises the same problem of acquisition of the best talent by the
wealthiest team; however, players will be added by any team only if the
marginal revenue product of the player exceeds his cost, so that the
dependence of revenue on competition in playing strengths among teams
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makes it unprofitable for any one team to be "too" superior to other
teams, whatever the wealth of the team.^ Rottenberg shows that the
primary impact of the reserve clause is instead a redistribution of income
among players and between players and owners.
We are not primarily concerned here with either the equity or other
such aspects of the reserve clause, however. Instead, we are interested in
the question of whether the collection of rules governing the business
aspects of professional sports has any tendency toward equalization of
playing strengths among clubs or is in fact consistent with such equaliza-
tion.
We consider a simplified model of an «-team professional sports league
which incorporates certain features of the reserve clause, drafting proce-
dures, and provisions governing the sales of player contracts among teams
similar to those employed in professional sports. In this section, we ignore
the problems associated with minor leagues and the training of players
by assuming that newly drafted players add immediately to the stock of
playing skills of a team. In section 4 we include the training costs and
time lags incident to minor league operations. Thus the model of this
section is more applicable to sports such as professional football and
basketball, while the model of the next section adds the further com-
plications associated with baseball and hockey.
Each team is assumed to act so as to maximize the discounted present
value of net cash flows from operations of the team. We also postulate
a perfect capital market so that the rate of discount for each team is the
market rate of interest. With each team is associated a stock of "playing
skills" which may be altered through purchase of contracts from other
teams in the league or through purchase of contracts of new players in
the annual draft. In addition, it is assumed that the stock of playing skills
for any team depreciates over time at an exponential rate that is the same
for every team in the league.
The notion of a stock of playing skills utilized in this paper represents
an aggregation over the many specialized and complementary skills re-
quired in a professional sports team. In a more detailed treatment, a
vector-valued concept incorporating the various specialized skills used by
sports teams might be employed, but, because we concentrate on the
financial aspects of sports, the aggregated concept appears adequate for
our purposes. In the treatment employed here, each player possesses a
certain number of units of playing skills, and the strength of a team is
1 Actually, one of the problems Rottenberg does not discuss is how to determine
marginal revenue product and marginal cost in professional sports where difficulties
arise because of the externalities inherent in the industry (see section 3).
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measured simply by summing the playing skills of the players whose
contracts are owned by the team. It should be mentioned that, because
of this method of aggregation, trades of players for players are not con-
sidered in our treatment, but instead only sales of contracts for cash.
The essential economic fact concerning professional team sports is that
gate receipts depend crucially on the uncertainty of outcome of the games
played within the league. As the probability of either team winning ap-
proaches 1, gate receipts fall substantially. Consequently, every team has
an economic motive for not becoming "too" superior in playing talent
compared with other teams in the league. On the other hand, gate receipts
of the home team are an increasing function of the probability of the
home team winning for some range beyond a probability of .5, so that
every team also has an economic motive to be somewhat superior to the
rest of the league. Finally, gate receipts at the home park of team / are
also a function of the size of the market area in which team i is located.
We formalize the above discussion in terms of the following notation: let
/, ^ stock of playing skills of team f, for / = 1 , . . . , « ;
Xij ^ number of units of playing skills acquired by team i through
purchase of playing contracts of team ;;
Xix = number of units of playing skills acquired by team i in the
draft of new players;
Wi = wage rate per unit of playing skills per period paid by team i;
bij = price of a unit of playing skills acquired in a purchase by
team /" from team ;;
biK = price of a unit of playing skills acquired in the draft by team r,
i ? , / " = net gate receipts from games played between teams / and ;
at the home park of team /;
a = share of gate receipts paid to the home team;
Ml = I'/Xjij = relative share of playing skills in the league under
contract to team /;
Pij = Ii/{Ii + />) ^ probability that team i will defeat team ;.
Then Ri is given by
where Rij{i) is a concave function of F,>, attaining a regular maximum at
some P* > .5. We assume a simplified version of the drafting procedure,
with x.^^ =z g(M.)a:^, where JĈ , is the supply of new playing skills and
g(Mi) satisfies g(Mi) > 0 for 0 ^ M^ < 1 and g'iMi) < 0 over this
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range. Further, 2^(Af,) = 1 for 2Mi =: 1. In particular, g{Mi) can be
» i
represented by g = {n — l)~Ml — Mi).
We view the market for existing player contracts as one in which bij =
bi for all ;, where 6, = bi(I.Xij), b, ^ 0. That is, for any one team, the
price paid for existing players is the same wherever acquired, and the
price is a nondecreasing function of the number of playing units de-
manded. We take the wage rate Wi = w for all teams and assume, in addi-
tion, bis = bx for all teams, these prices being independent of inventories
and number of new playing units drafted, respectively.
Under these assumptions, the decision problem for team i is the follow-
ing:
max ^̂  (/?, - wl, - b^xty - bi
subject to
I x + 2 XjK- — \Jj, ; • =
0, ; = 1 , . . . , w
where X . A - = ^(Af,)xf ' a n d JC,, = : 0 for / = 1 , . . . , « .
The unique nature of the economic structure of the professional sports
industry arises from the fact that team i's revenues as well as its access
to new players depend not only on its own decision variables (particularly
/,) but also on the decision variables of the other teams in the league.
Team fs choice of contract sales JC.J partially determines inventories of
playing skills for other teams, at least in equilibrium when such choices
are consistent with the choices of other teams so that jc.y = —Xji for ; ^ i.
However, team i has no control over contract sales among other teams.
The consequence is that team i is involved in a problem of decision making
under uncertainty involving complex game theoretic difficulties. The joint
decision problem for teams in the league may be characterized as an
«-person nonzero sum differential game, and, as is well known, even the
concept of a "solution" to the problem is not well defined. To motivate
the approach we will follow, suppose we consider a situation in which
equalization of playing strengths characterizes the league, that is, />(/) ^
I i { t ) for a.\\ i, j ^ If . . . y n a n d a l l t. T h e n Ij = Ii i s a n i d e n t i t y i n t, s o
t h a t
2 Xjk — \dj = Xix + 2 xa- — \ili,
k k
i, j , and t, equalization of playing strength implies
for all /, ;, and t.
k
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If choices of contract sales are mutually consistent among teams, then
Xik = —Xki for all /, k: hence 2 2 Xij, = 0, which, together with 2 Xjk =
i k fc
2 Xik, implies 2 Xjk = 0 for every ;*.
k k
Thus if we restrict our attention to time paths along which equalization
of playing strengths occurs, net contract sales by each team in the league
are zero, assuming market clearing.
The approach we adopt in this paper is to assume that the firm treats
its own contract sales as under its own control, while it assumes that no
contract sales take place among other teams. These assumptions are con-
sistent with the profit-maximizing choices of other teams if the league is
on a time path of equal playing strengths for all teams and the optimal
amount of contract sales Xj^ = 0 for every ;', k. Note that this is somewhat
stronger than the assumption of zero net contract sales by each team
which is implied by equal playing strengths, but there appears to be only
a slight loss of generality in this approach. ,̂ ^
The /th team thus chooses optimal time paths / •" , x.. for ; = 1 , . . . ,« ,
to maximize the discounted present value of net cash flows, under the as-
sumption that Xjk := 0, for ;, k y^ i. An equilibrium for the league occurs
when the following consistency conditions are met at each point in time:
all i,j,k, (1)
Xij = —Xji ( = 0 ) for all i, j, (2)
0 0
2 l (3)
bi(O) =bj{0) =b for all i, j . (4)





be the Hamiltonian for team /, where ,̂7 is the multiplier associated with
the differential equation for Ij. At an interior maximizing solution (Ij > 0









, ; = ! , . . . , « , (ii)
Ij =
lim = 0 , ; • = 1 , . . . , w .
Since Xij — 0 for every /, ;, and ^,(0) =
condition (i) we have ^,/ = qik for ;, I
= b for every f, ;,





The variable g may be interpreted as the addition to the discounted
present value of cash flows for team i of a unit increase in Ij (jy^i),
while qa is similarly the addition to the discounted present value of cash
flows for team i of a unit increase in / j .
We first consider the question of consistency of profit-maximizing
choices by teams with a time path characterized by equal playing strengths,
in the special case where bi is treated as a parameter by team /, so that
y. = 0. The basic proposition that holds is the following:
Proposition 1.—If bi is treated as a parameter by the /th team profit
maximization by each team is inconsistent with a time path of equal
playing strengths for all teams.
In essence, as is easily verified, this result follows from the ''bang-bang"
nature of the maximization problem when bi is a parameter, since Xij enters
both the objective function and the constraints in linear fashion. If Xij is
completely unconstrained in magnitude, a profit-maximizing position does
not exist; if Xij is restrained by a (finite) positive upper bound and nega-
tive lower bound, Xij r= 0 does not occur at a profit-maximizing position.
When team i regards bi as a strictly increasing function of Sx,;, then





— w — b
dXiN \
6t
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Further,
while
where IT = 2r=i^>- With equal playing strengths for all teams, Mr = l /«
for every r: hence 6A;,v = —(I/In'-) x^2! for i^r, and dXr^/dlr^^
[ (»— 1)/In-] r^'^', where g' is evaluated at M^ = l /« for every r, and
/ j = / f o r ; • = 1 , . . . , « .










From condition (ii) we immediately obtain proposition 2.
Proposition 2.—Profit maximizing is consistent with equal playing
strengths only if dRi/dlj = dRi/dh for all ;", k ^ i and for all i.
In effect, proposition 2 asserts that the market areas in which teams are
located must not differ from one another sufficiently so that team i finds
its gate receipts affected more by an increase in the strength of one team
than by an increase in the strength of another, given that all teams are of
equal strength.
To examine further the properties of the solution time path under equal
playing strengths, introduce the following notation and change of variables:
Let dRi/dlj — c for ; 7^ /, and let dRi/dl^ — w = d. Further, let Z =
and y = qae^^. Then
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where










22 = : 8 - f - |X
In-
020 = —d
Choose Z and v to satisfy Z = 0 and v = 0. Then Z v are uniquely
determined if and only if 011^22 — ^12^21 7^ 0. But 011022 — ^ 1 2 ^ 2 1 ^










It might further be noted that, since
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dh 4/
and
di?i 1 r dRiuii)
a
dh 4/ L ap,fc
along a time path of equal playing strengths.
Since each of the « teams in the league satisfies the relations above,
we have
dh dh
Further, 3/?ifc'*V#tfc == ~(^^ik*'V5^fct)) so that the following relations
hold among teams (where dRih'**/dpiic. is denoted by a^^^):
. i k i iv k i
a(fltk + fltE — dij — dii) — Oki — Oji,
. k i k j . i ]•
, j i i fc. i k
u l u f f -T~ (*n — ^ik — ^fcyJ - . ujf — Qtci'
In particular, these relations are satisfied when all teams have identif
revenue functions so that, evaluated at Pa ̂  .5 for all i ^ j , we may dc
note a', by 6 for all i=?^}. By our earlier discussion, 9 > 0 (home gat
receipts are an increasing function of the probability of winning for sor
range beyond a probability of winning of .5). In this special case, one maj
establish that the home team's share of gate receipts must exceed .5.
Proposition 3.—If all revenue functions of teams in the league
identical, a time path along which playing strengths are equal is i
sistent with profit maximization by teams only if a, the home team's
of gate receipts, exceeds .5.





PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUE I3I3
since S > 0, g'/g < 0, and A.v ̂  b.
Intuitively, this result holds because the expressions for dRi/dh and
dRi/dh are given by
~a7r~ 4/
dh 4/ ^ -> ' •
If a :r= .5 revenue for team i is a maximum (with respect to its own In-
ventory) at a position of equal playing strengths, and the marginal rev-
enue for team i is the same from adding a unit to its own inventory as
selling a unit to any other team. But adding a unit to its own inventory
involves the additional costs of (1) paying out b dollars for such a unit,
(2) losing the draft preference by being stronger than other teams, and
(3) paying wages of w dollars per unit purchased. All of these costs are
reflected in the term (d -f [i)b + (\xg'/g) (fi.v — b) -{-w. Hence profit
maximization is inconsistent with a = .5 and also for a < .5.
To summarize, we have shown that a time path along which playing
strengths are equal for all teams is consistent with profit maximization by
teams only if (1) net sales of contracts by every team are zero, (2) the
purchase price of existing player contracts is not treated parametrically
by teams, (3) revenue functions for all teams are similar in the sense that
dRi/dlj^^ dRi/dh ^or every i^}=j^ k\ (4) if revenue functions are iden-
tical for all teams, in which case a > .5.
The most important point concerning this analysis is that, even with the
reserve clause acting as a constraint on the movement of players to the
wealthier teams and even with the draft system operating to equalize
strengths, the rules permitting sales of player contracts among teams lead
to unequal playing strengths so long as franchises are located in cities with
markedly different revenue potentials. It is not surprising, then, that
casual empiricism indicates that in no professional team sport under cur-
rent rules of operation is there a tendency toward equal playing strengths.
The histories of the various professional sports contain numerous in-
stances of attempts to alter rules of operation to offset the tendency
toward dominance of a league by its wealthier teams, including the intro-
duction of the reserve clause, drafting procedures, limitations on player
rosters, restrictions on ownership of farm clubs, and even attempts to
syndicate a sport under common ownership. All of these have thus far
failed in their objectives, because of the imbalance of revenue potential
among franchises. Under the conditions characterizing the model of this
paper, however, there is a simple change in the rules of professional sports
leagues that guarantees convergence to a state of equal playing strengths,
given only that the supply of new playing skills is constant over time. This
is summarized in proposition 4.
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Proposition 4.—Assume that the supply of new playing skills is constant
over time. If sales of player contracts for cash are forbidden, then, given
any distribution of initial stocks of playing skills among teams, time paths
of stocks of playing skills converge to one of equal playing strengths for
all teams.
To prove proposition 4, recall that the basic differential equation govern-
ing the stock of playing skills for team i is given by
h = Xiif + llxij — yJi, i—l,...,n.
j
If sales of contracts are forbidden, Xij =: 0 for every i, ;; hence Ii = Xijf —
i, where
1 / /A ,
= I 1 — — I :X:A , where IT=
n — 1 \ IT^
Then /^=x*',— fi/^,, where jĉ ^ is a constant independent of /. Solving
this differential equation we obtain
s -, 8
where IriO) is the initial stock of playing skills in the league.
Let V ^ Ii — Ij so that v =z Ii — IJ; hence
V = {Xix — Xjx) — ^( / j — IJ) ;
8




i ' V dt,
where
H
a = n— 1
s V s
XN \ XN
) , Y =
Hence ln v — —[it — a -\- y.
Let y — + Y so that dy — — . Thus
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dt - r dy r dy
y{y — y) J
— In (3' — Y)
Y Y
•yy




After substitution we obtain
[/.(O) -IJ
— 1 »
Thus if IT¥=O for any /, lim 7,(0 — Ij(t) = 0, and hence convergence
to a state of equal playing strengths characterizes the league.
From the proof of proposition 4, in particular the expression for 7,(0 —
Ij{i), we obtain an immediate corollary.
Proposition 5.—If the supply of new playing talent is constant over
time, then (with cash sales of contracts forbidden) convergence to a state
of equal playing strengths occurs more rapidly the fewer teams there are
in the league and the larger the rate of depreciation of playing skills is.
To illustrate, under a set of rules banning the sales of player contracts
for cash, one would expect to find a more rapid convergence to a position
of equal playing strengths in football than in baseball because the playing
lifetime in football is considerably less than in baseball, and the number
of teams participating in the annual player draft is roughly the same in the
two sports twenty-four in baseball, twenty-six in football). Proposition 5
also indicates that, in general, expansion of leagues through the addition
of franchises tends to operate in the direction of offsetting convergence.
The fundamental reason that convergence to equal playing strengths
occurs when sales of contracts are banned is that this effectively eliminates
the operation of the profit motive by owners in dealings among teams in
the league, although such a motive may still be exercised in the internal
operations of the team itself. Because of the externalities inherent in
professional sports, profit maximization does not necessarily lead to
desirable, much less optimal, results even from the point of view of the
owners of the teams and, as indicated above, generally confiicts with the
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equalization of strengths in the league that represents the primary justifica-
tion for antitrust exemption for team sports.
These conclusions may be extended to the case where training of players
occurs as an activity of teams in the league. Section 4 deals with this case.
In baseball and hockey, new players acquired in the draft typically require
an extended period of training in the minor leagues before they are skillful
enough to be of value to the major league team. In this section we consider
the decision problem facing owners of teams when time lags and training
costs are incorporated into the problem. The notation employed above is
used in this section as well, and the basic assumptions made concerning the
earlier model apply to this model.
Let Zi(t) denote the stock of playing skills in training at time t and let
the training period be T units of time. Then
We assume that the cost of training is an increasing function of the
stock of playing skills in the process of training; hence this cost may be
written as a function f.iZ), where f. > 0.
Firm / acts to solve the following problem:
00




As in the earlier analysis, equalization of playing strengths implies zero
net trades by all teams. We adopt the stronger assumption of zero trades
among all teams.
Assuming that Xj^ =: 0 for ;, k ^ i, and assuming that 6, is an increasing
function of 2x,y, necessary conditions for a maximum as given by Halany
(1968) are the follo^ving: let
where
j
Then at a maximum,






; = 1 , . . . , « , (9)
k
=Xiy(t) -Xiy(t-T), (10)
lim ^ , , ( 0 = 0, ; = 1 , . . . , « , (11)
\imp{t) = 0. (12)
Consider now an equilibrium time path along which x^ = 0 for every
/, ; and all teams have equal playing strengths. Assume in addition that
the stock of new playing skills is constant over time. Then Xi^ = Xjx =




is a constant, and /> = fe~^^ may be solved to obtain /> = — [ (e~*V6) X
/'(TJIC,V)]. (By transversality condition lim p (t) == 0; hence p (0) = —
From condition (5), g^ = Qik for all ;, k y^i; hence denote qij by q for
; =7̂  /. It is immediately clear that proposition 1 of section 1 holds for this
model as well, since Xij enters linearly into the objective function and the
constraints. Hence bi, cannot be treated parametrically by any team if
equal playing strengths and profit maximization occur.
The expressions for ija and q can be simplified to














Thus proposition 2 holds as well, since dRi/dij = dRi/dlk for all ;,
k ^ i. Because of the complexities associated with obtaining explicit
solutions to mixed difference-differential equation systems, no attempt has
been made to verify proposition 3, however.
It remains to consider the problem of convergence to a position of equal
playing strengths from an arbitrary initial distribution among teams of
stocks of playing skills, when sales of playing contracts are banned. From
the condition Xi^ = 0 for all i, ; we obtain / ,( /) ^ A:,.Y(̂  — T) —
f = 1, . . . , « . Assume rMs a constant over time. Then
where IT = E
hence
p — fit I
L e t I ' ( / ) = / , ( 0 — I j { i ) '




(n - + xl
liV(t).
To show that lim v{t) = 0 , we use the following result of El'sgol'tc
(1966, p. 72, example 1):
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Theorem.~x + ax(t) -f b(t)x{t — x)=0 is (asymptotically) stable
if \b{t)\ < f l for a l l / .
Let fl = ^ and
(n-
Let / ( / ) = [7^(0) - A : y | i ] e - ^ ' e ^ ^ so that / ' ( / ) = -\jd{t). If 7^(0)
x^ii, then 6 ( 0 = | ^ / n - l ; hence \b{t)\<a = [i. If 7^(0) > x^
then max \b{t)\ = b{0). But
6(0) = - ^ {[IAO) - XN/\i]e'^^ + XN/^I}-' < ^ < fl.
(w — 1) « — 1
If 7^(0) < A:^/|I and 7 ( 0 > 0 for all /, then sup |^>(0| = Hm b{t).
But lim 6( / ) =r |n/(« — 1) < a; hence convergence occurs for arbitrary
initial conditions.
Thus propositions 1, 2, and 4 hold when training of players is incorpo-
rated into the decision problem of professional sports teams.
The general conclusion that one may derive from the analysis of the paper
is that, under present rules of operation, professional sports leagues will
exhibit no tendency toward equalization of playing strengths. If franchises
were located in areas with generally equal revenue potential, equalization
might occur even under the present rules, but this condition is patently
violated in all of the four major professional sports. On the other hand,
changing the rules to prohibit the sales of player contracts among teams
guarantees convergence over time to equal playing strengths. Such a rule
would generally violate the antitrust statutes, since it can only be promul-
gated and enforced by joint action of all teams in the league. However,
antitrust exemption to permit such a provision appears to be amply justified
because of the externalities peculiar to professional sports. On the other
hand, the current antitrust exemption afforded professional baseball has
not resulted in institutional changes in the industry leading toward equal-
ization of playing strengths.
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